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RECENT DECISIONS

possessor will be required before the visitor will be held to be an invitee. This is consistent with the logic inherent in the "invitation"
theory, and finds support in the fact that no Wisconsin cases have been
found where a person was held to be an invitee where some possibility
of such benefit was not present. As stated in the Greenfield case, 31 the
court, in making its determination, will look to all the circumstances,
including the nature of the invitation and necessary implications to be
derived therefrom.
JoHN P. FOLEY
Municipal Corporations: Burden of Persuasion Required in
Ordinance Violations: Defendant was found guilty of racing his
automobile in violation of.a city ordinance' which has a direct counterpart in a criminal state statute.2 The circuit court reversed the conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain it.
When confronted with City of Madison v. Geier3 on appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, held that when a
violation of a municipal ordinance also constitutes a crime under state
law it must be proved by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
In coming to its conclusion the majority reviewed the three wellaccepted burdens of proof :4
(1) Mere preponderance.
(2) Clear, satisfactory and convincing.
(3) Beyond a reasonable doubt.5
The first two are applied to civil cases-the first to the ordinary civil
case and the second to those civil cases which involve fraud or criminal
offenses.' Observing that ordinance violations have long been held to
32 Ibid. note 18.
' Madison, Wis., Municipal Code §12.86.
2WIs. STAT. §346.94(2)

(1963) providing: "Racing. No operator of a motor
vehicle shall participate in any race or speed or endurance contest upon any
highway."
'27 Wis. 2d 687, 135 N.W. 2d 761 (1965).
4 A precise definition of the two meanings of the phrase "burden of proof"
is found in Sellers v. Kincaid, 303 Ill. 216, 155 N.E. 429 (1922). In this civil
case, the clear distinction is made between (1) the duty of producing evidence as the case progresses, and (2) the duty to establish the truth of the
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. One able writer, McCoRIlClC ON
EVIDENCE, §307 (1954), explains the former as the burden of producing evidence and the latter as the burden of persuasion. See also 9 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, §§2485-2489 (3rd ed. 1940).
5 The majority in the Geier case was therefore referring to the three measures
of the jury's persuasion designated by Wigmore, supra note 4, §§2497-2498, as
(1) mere preponderance, (2) clear, satisfactory and convincing, and (3)
beyond a reasonable doubt. See also McCormick, supra note 4, §§318-321.
6 Roberts v. Saukville Canning Co., 250 Wis. 112, 26 N.W. 2d 145 (1947);
Poertner v. Poertner, 66 Wis. 644, 29 N.W. 386 (1886) ; see also McCormick,
supra note 4, §320 and Wigmore, supra note 4, §2498. Clear satisfactory and
convincing evidence has been held to be required in those civil cases which
involve fraud, undue influence, a lost deed or will, a parol gift, an agreement
for adoption or to bequeath by will, mutual mistake sufficient to justify
reformation of an instrument, a parol or constructive trust, an oral contract

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

be civil actions7 and that in this case a criminal act was involved, the
majority logically found that the prosecution in such a case must prove
the guilt of the defendant by evidence which meets the second burden
of proof, i.e., that applied in civil cases involving fraud or criminal
offenses. 8
The minority advanced a vigorous argument for the retention of the
mere preponderance burden in all forfeiture cases. This position was
based on their conclusion that no sufficient reason had been shown
which would justify changing the well established mere preponderance
rule.9
The question of which burden of persuasion should be required in
ordinance violation cases has been met with varied answers based upon
diverse reasonings. The various states hold as many views on the subject as appear possible.
The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v.Jamieson °
exemplifies a line of cases which require only a mere preponderance
of the evidence in all municipal ordinance violation cases, whether involving acts also constituting crimes or not. These cases do not consider the possibility of using the middle burden of proof where the
violation also constitutes a crime under state law. As between the first
and third burdens, the decisions rest on the basic premise that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt can only be required in prosecutions by
the state for an offense constituting a violation of a criminal statute ;11
as a basis for specific performance, an agreement to hold a deed absolute
as a mortgage and other specific points held to be of importance in local
practice.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has consistently held that a suit to recover
a penalty for the violation of a municipal ordinance is a civil action. Village
of Platteville v. Bell, 43 Wis. 488 (1878). See also Neenah v. Krueger, 206
Wis. 473, 475, 240 N.W. 402, 404 (1932) in which the court said: "Under
the statutes of this state, actions are of two kinds-civil and criminal. A
criminal action is defined as one prosecuted by the state against a person
charged with a public offense for the punishment thereof. Every other action
is a civil action."
s Madison v. Geier, 27 Wis. 2d 687, 692, 135 N.W. 2d 761, 763 (1965), where
the court phrased its conclusion as follows: "We considered ordinance forfeiture cases so far as the elements of the violation were concerned when
the acts also amounted to a crime to be in that class of civil actions which
involved fraud, undue influence, criminal acts, reformation, mutual mistakes,
and others, which public policy requires to be proved by evidence which is
clear, satisfactory and convincing."
9Id. at 699, 135 N.W. 2d at 767.
10211 Minn. 262, 300 N.W. 809 (1941). See also Handler v. City and County
of Denver, 102 Colo. 53, 77 P. 2d 132 (1938) ; City of Bloomington v. Kossow,
-Minn. - , 131 N.W. 2d 206 (1964) ; State v. Siporen, 215 Minn. 438,
10 N.W. 2d 353 (1943); Warren v. State, 162 Neb. 623, 76 N.W. 2d 728
(1956); Francisco v. State, 108 Neb. 440, 187 N.W. 881 (1922); City of
Sparta v. Lewis, 91 Tenn. 370, 23 S.W. 182 (1892).
" State v. Jamieson, 211 Minn. 262, 300 N.W. 809, 810 (1941) where it was
said: "It has repeatedly been decided by this court, as it has elsewhere, that
municipal ordinances are not criminal statutes; that violations thereof are
not crimes, nor are such violations governed by the rules of the criminal
law, save in certain specified exceptional particulars."
"It has long been settled that the violation of a city ordinance is not a
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but that since forfeiture cases are prosecutions by municipalities for
ordinance violations, rather than prosecutions by the state for criminal
statute violations, proof beyond a reasonable doubt may not be required.1 2 The same anachronistic result was reached by the Delaware
Supreme Court when it concluded that if the prosecution were for the
violation of state law, guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt;
but if for the violation of an identical city ordinance, guilt need only
be proved by a mere preponderance of the evidence.13 Standing alone,
the Oregon supreme court has held that a forfeiture case is criminal
in nature. However, that court then came to the unprecedented conclusion that because of the criminal nature of that case it need only be
proved by a mere preponderance of the evidence.24
Because of the penal nature 5 of ordinance violation cases, several
states have adopted a burden of persuasion which is at least slightly
more strict than the mere preponderance burden.', Although not expressed in exactly the same language, the burden of proof used by
these states is the practical equivalent of the clear, satisfactory and
convincing burden now adopted by Wisconsin. However, the other
states which require the middle burden to be met in order to produce
a conviction hold this burden applicable to all forfeiture cases whether
constituting a crime or not.'7 This uniform application of the middle
burden of proof has been justified on the theory that an individual
should not be subjected to fines which will divest him of his property
merely because there is a little more evidence that he has committed
the prohibited act, than there is that he has not. The Illinois supreme
court felt that "to allow a jury to enter upon this nice balancing of
probabilities in cases of this character, would be to open wide a dangerous door."'- With the reasoning of this decision in mind, it becomes
criminal offense against the state, but only against the municipality enacting
the ordinance, and that the provisions for enforcing such ordinances and for
prosecuting violations thereof need not conform to the provisions for prosecuting violations of the state laws."
12 Ibid.
13.Mayor and Council of Wilmington v. Durham, 51 Del. 423, 147 A. 2d 516
(1958).
In dealing with an ordinance requiring the licensing of messengers, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that: "This being in the nature of a criminal action,
the evidence must prove a violation of the provisions of the ordinance by
a mere preponderance only, and such proof need not be direct." City of
Portland v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 75 Ore. 37, 146 P. 148 at 151 (1915).
Is"Penal means containing or relating to a penalty. A penal action is one upon
a penal statute, it is an action which enforces a forfeiture or penalty for
transgressing the law. The term penal is broader than criminal and relates
to actions which are not necessarily criminal as well." BLAcK, LAW DicTIONARY 1289 (4th ed. 1951).
16 Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw Railway Co. v. Foster, 43 Ill. 480 (1867); City
of Chicago v. Carney, 34 Ill. App. 2d 303, 180 N.E. 2d 729 (1962); Jersey
City Land and Improvement Company v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey
City, 95 N.J.L. 34, 111 A. 275 (1920).
17 Cases cited note 16 supra.
18 Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw Railway Co. v. Foster, supra note 17, at 481
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apparent that the line of cases requiring the middle burden of persuasion holds the consequences of a forfeiture action to be similar to the
consequences of a criminal proceeding rather than to those of a civil
proceeding.
This rational approach of looking to the consequences of the action
takes the realitie's of the situation into account more fully than does the
rationale of the cases which merely inquire as to which body is prosecuting the action, the state or its subdivision, the municipality. In an
extention of this view, a third and very convincing line of cases has
reached the conclusion that forfeiture actions should be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. 9 This result is based on the principle that a prosecution for the violation of a city ordinance is civil in form but quasicriminal in character.20 Forfeiture cases have been systematically held
to be governed by the civil rules of pleading," but if they were solely
civil no fine or imprisonment could be inflicted. 22 Nor can they be forced
into the strict definition of a criminal action, because they are not techniwhere the court in emphasizing its point went on to say: "Before a jury
renders a verdict taking away a person's property in the form of a fine,
they should be satisfied that the law has been violated, and if the evidence
fails to produce upon their minds, that degree of conviction upon which
they should be willing to act in important affairs of their own, it is not
sufficient, even though there may be a very slight perponderance."
19 People v. Levine, 21 App. Div. 2d 903, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 721 (1964) (violations
of the health code must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); People v.
Severns, 37 Misc. 2d. 382, 234 N.Y.S. 2d 834 (1962) (convicted of operating
a junk yard without a license in violation of city ordinance; held that every
essential element of the charge must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt) ;
People v. Staie, 10 Misc. 2d 959, 172 N.Y.S. 2d 351 (1958) (as to a violation
of a speeding ordinance the court said the same fundamental rules apply to
proof necessary for convictions under city ordinances as apply to convictions
for crimes, and all essential elements must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt); People v. Scandore, 6 N.Y. Misc. 2d 152, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 785, motion
granted 167 N.Y.S. 2d 917, 145 N.E. 2d 866 (1958) (A violation of park
rules must be proved so that no reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt
remains). As is apparent from the above decisions, the New York courts
require all forfeiture cases to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ohio requires ordinance violation cases to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt when the act constituting the violation is also prohibited by state law.
This is achieved by designating such an ordinance violation prosecuting a
criminal action. See City of Berea v. Petcher, 119 Ohio App. 165, 188 N.E.
2d 605 (1963) and City of Columbus v. Treadwell, 46 Ohio L. Abs. 367, 65
N.E. 2d 720 (1946).
See also Smith v. City of Birmingham, Ala. App. - , 168 So. 2d
35, 38 (1964) (in speaking of the violation of a loitering ordinance the court
stated that "the burden of proof is the same in both misdemeanor and
ordinance trials. The rules of evidence are the same. The defendant can
suffer virtually the same incarceration and pay similar fines."); Long v.
City of Opelika, 37 Ala. App. 200, 66 So. 2d 126 (1953); Geer v. Alaniz,
138 Colo. 177, 331 P. 2d 260 (1958) (In considering a habeus corpus proceeding by prisoners convicted of ordinance violations, the court held that
violations of ordinances which have counter parts in criminal statutes are
triable in accordance with criminal procedure) ; Elias v. City of Tulsa,
342 P. 2d 573 (Crim. App. 1959) (city had the burden of proving the violation of a zoning ordinance beyond a reasonable doubt).
20 City of Stanberry v. O'Neal, 166 Mo. App. 709, 150 S.W. 1104 (1912).
21 City of St. Louis v. Flynn, - Mo.-, 386 S.W. 2d 44 (1965).
22 City of Stanberry v. O'Neal, 166 Mo. App. 709, 150 S.W. 1104 (1912).

RECENT DECISIONS
23
cally offenses against the state in its sovereign capacity. In speaking

of municipal forfeitures the Alabama supreme court stated that "these
offenses-particularly those which may be punished by imprisonment
or hard labor-partake so far of the nature of criminal prosecutions
24
that they should be subject to the same rules of evidence.
It is not an uncommon charter power that cities may prescribe either
fines or imprisonment in jail, or both, for a violation of an ordinance.2 5
It is this power to deprive the individual of liberty and property which
has prompted courts to afford the presumption of innocence to defendants in such cases. 26 Granting that the grounds for the presumption are present, "such presumption is but another and more forcible
way of stating that the burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's guilt, and until this is done, he is, in law,
not guilty.

'27

In considering an ordinance prosecution for disturbing

the peace, Justice Ellison aptly stated the guiding principle when
he held that "the citizen ought to have the benefit of the presumption
of innocence, and he ought not to be disgraced, stigmatized, and punished if the evidence leaves the jury in reasonable doubt of his guilt.

' 28

Although the views as to which burden should be required vary
widely, they appear to stem from just two basic theories. On the one
hand, the states which cling to the more conservative mere preponderance burden base their view on the ancient distinction between civil
and criminal cases, 29 easily concluding therefrom that if the prosecution is not by the state the defendant need only be proved guilty by a
mere preponderance of the evidence as in all other civil cases. On the
other hand, many state courts have taken a more realistic, and perhaps
more perceptive, view of the problem and asked themselves what difference it might make to the convicted and imprisoned or fined defendant whether he was prosecuted by the state or by its subdivision, the
Barron v. City of Anniston, 157 Ala. 399, 48 So. 58 (1908).
Ala. App.
Id. at 401, 48 So. at 59. See also Smith v. City of Birmingham, 168 So. 2d 35 (1964), wherein the Alabama court heavily emphasized
-,
the fact that effects and consequences of the two actions are the same.
25 5 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §15.12 (3rd ed. 1949) and cases there
cited.
26 City of Stanberry v. O'Neal, 166 Mo. App. 709, 150 S.W. 1104 (1912). See
also JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 82 (2d ed. 1926)
where the learned author, speaking of the presumption of innocence, states
that "although some of the reasons which lead to the adoption of this presumption have disappeared with the severity of the old criminal law, yet the
sacredness of reputation and liberty still gives sanction to the rule that the
law presumes in favor of innocence. The favor with which this presumption
is regarded in the law is illustrated in this, that when misconduct or crime
is alleged, whether in a criminal or in a civil suit, whether in a direct proceeding to punish the offender or in some collateral manner, the accused is

23

24

27 presumed innocent until proved guilty."

28
29

Annot. 34 A.L.R. 938, 939 (1925).
City of Stanberry v. O'Neal, 166 Mo. App. 709, 713, 150 S.W. 1104, 1106 (1912).
See note 11 supra.
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municipality.30 The answer to this question being obvious, those courts
have afforded the presumption of innocence to all defendants whose
liberty or property stands in jeopardy as a result of a prosecution by
the state or by the municipality, 31 and thereby required their guilt to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that the source of authority
is the same for municipal ordinances and state statutes 32 adds additional
force to the latter view.
Although, by virtue of City of Madison v. Geier, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has adopted the middle burden of proof in those forfeiture cases which also involve crimes under state law, all other forfeiture cases need only be proved by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Our court obviously feels that the delicate distinction drawn between criminal fines, on the one hand, and civil fines (more accurately
termed forfeitures or monetary penalties recoverable in a civil action)
on the other, is of great import. This distinction rests not on the size
or severity but rather on who finally reaps the proceeds. The Wisconsin
Constitution makes it clear that the proceeds of all fines (as opposed
to civil penalties or forfeitures) shall be paid into the state school
fund. 3 3 Municipal forfeiture proceeds, however, are paid to the local
unit of government whose ordinance or regulation imposes the forfeiture, as provided by section 288.10 of the Wisconsin statutes.
The present state of Wisconsin law on the question of burden of
proof in forfeiture cases can be brought into clearer focus by considering an example. Suppose A and B, as accomplices, engage in an act
prohibited by a city ordinance and by a state criminal statute. Suppose
further that A is prosecuted by the municipality under the ordinance
and B is prosecuted by the state under the criminal statute. If in both
cases the prosecution produces evidence which meets the middle burden
of proof, i.e., clear, satisfactory and convincing, but which does not
meet the third burden, i.e., guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, A would
be convicted because the required burden for a forfeiture case was met
while B would not be convicted because the criminal burden was not
met. The same act was committed by both. The respective prosecutions
produced the same evidence. The result, however, was different. The
inquiry seems clear: if the law comes from the same authority, covers
30

See cases cited note 19 supra and Barron v. City of Anniston, 157 Ala. 399,

48 So. 58 (1908).

31 Ibid.

" One learned writer expresses the point as follows: "The reason for such
binding effect of municipal ordinances is that both municipal ordinances and
state statutes are from a common source of authority. One class presents
it in a delegated, and the other in a direct form, but it is the power of the
state which speaks in both." 5 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §15.14
(3rd Ed. 1949) and cases there cited.
33 Wis. Const., art X, §2. See also State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis.
79, 28 N.W. 2d 345 (1947) and Stoltman v. Town of Lake, 124 Wis. 462, 465,
466, 102 N.W. 920, 921 (1905).
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the same offenses and the effects of enforcement are the same, why
should the defendant in the state prosecution be afforded the presumption of innocence, requiring him to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, while the defendant in the municipal prosecution is not
presumed innocent?
In view of the strong argument for affording the presumption of
innocence to defendants in ordinance violation cases, which has been
recognized by many other states, partial departure from the mere preponderance rule by our court in the Geier case could be an indication
of a more complete departure in the future should the court be confronted with the proper case.
TERRY R. GRAY
Products Liability: Strict Liability in Tort-Defenses-Indemnity-Contribution: In 1957, plaintiffs Suvada and Konecnik, partners, purchased a used reconditioned tractor unit from defendant White
Motor Company, for use in their milk distributing business. The brake
system for the tractor was manufactured by defendant BendixWestinghouse Automotive Air Brake Company and installed by White.
Three years later, the brake system failed and the truck collided with
a Chicago Transit Authority bus, causing injuries to a number of the
bus passengers and considerable damage to the bus and plaintiff's
tractor-trailer milk truck. In Suvada v. White Motor Co.,' the plaintiffs
sued to recover the costs they incurred in (1) repairing their tractortrailer unit, (2) repairing the bus, and (3) settling the personal injury
claims of the bus passengers, including the costs of legal services and
investigation.
The complaint alleged that both Bendix and White were liable for
the stated damages because of a breach of implied warranty and negligence. The trial court, in response to the defendants' motion, ruled
plaintiffs had stated causes of action for damages to their tractor-trailer
unit against White on the warranty and negligence theories, and against
Bendix on the basis of negligence but dismissed the counts for damage
to the bus, personal injury claims, and expenses. Plaintiffs appealed
from this order to an intermediate appellate court, which ruled that
plaintiffs had stated causes of action for all elements of damage pleaded
against White and Bendix, on the basis of breach of an implied
warranty.'
Only Bendix sought review of this holding, giving rise to the decision herein discussed. Bendix argued that any warranty as to its
products ran only to White, since the plaintiffs were not in privity with
Bendix. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, ruled that Bendix's
Ill. 2d. -,
210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965).
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E. 2d 313 (1964).
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